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THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINAL ASSET FORFEITURE IN SOUTH 
AFRICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA 
V Basdeo 
1 Introduction 
The practice of criminal asset forfeiture does raise a serious impasse between public 
interest and constitutional rights. Though the proportions of South Africa's current 
organised crime problem is daunting and threatening,1 law enforcement measures 
threatening individual rights must withstand vigilant constitutional scrutiny lest South 
Africa's transition entail a shift from one oppressive regime to another. At the root of 
the tension pertaining to criminal asset forfeiture are certain principles which are 
generally accepted in societies that embrace liberal democratic values. These are the 
right to private property, which encompasses that the state may seize property only 
in terms of a law of general application; criminal guilt must be shown beyond a 
reasonable doubt; the guilty may be punished only by the state; and all should be 
treated equally before the law.2 In this article it is submitted that in circumstances 
where criminal asset forfeiture is employed as a law enforcement tool, the fulfilment 
by the state of its public responsibility ultimately results in a conflict between its 
public responsibility and its responsibility to respect the individual rights of persons 
whose property are subjected to asset forfeiture proceedings. 
Although criminal asset forfeiture is seen as the newly emerged tool for controlling 
criminal behaviour in the twenty-first century, it is said to have been in existence 
even during biblical times as a penal or a remedial action.3 The benefits of criminal 
asset forfeiture are indisputable. Criminal asset forfeiture enhances the ability of law 
                                        
  Vinesh Basdeo. BA (Hons) LLB LLM LLD (Unisa). Associate Professor, College of Law, University 
of South Africa. E-mail: mbasdeo@unisa.ac.za. This article is based on a doctoral thesis 
submitted by the author for the completion of the degree Doctor of Laws at the University of 
South Africa, Pretoria. 
1  De Koker 2002 Journal of Money Laundering Control 27-29. See further Redpath 2000 African 
Security Review 14-16. 
2  See for example the South African Bill of Rights, Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
3  For a historical account of forfeiture, see Greek Date Unknown 
http://www.fear.org/history/Greek_History_of_Fort_England_ColonialAmerica.html 40. 
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enforcement to combat organised criminal activity. This is of vital importance in 
South Africa, a country intensely threatened by organised crime.4  
2 Requirements and substantive legal provisions for criminal asset 
forfeiture 
2.1 The restraint stage 
In South Africa the restraint stage of criminal forfeiture proceedings involves the 
granting5 of a restraint order, which prohibits any person affected by the order from 
dealing in any manner with the property to which it applies.6 The restraint order is 
granted over realisable property,7 which includes any property held by the defendant 
concerned, as well as any property held by any third party who may have received 
affected gifts from the defendant.  
Sections 25 and 26 of POCA provide for the making of a restraint application and an 
order prior to or subsequent to a conviction. Such an application may be brought by 
the NDPP on behalf of the state ex parte, at a High Court, for an order prohibiting 
any person from dealing in any manner with any property to which the restraint 
order relates.8 In cases where there are victims, the state relies on their affidavits in 
support of the application. The short-term purpose of a restraint order is to preserve 
property9 which in due course will be realised in satisfaction of a confiscation order.10 
In the long term it provides for a recovery mechanism for the proceeds of unlawful 
activities.11 A court granting a restraint order may, amongst other directions, appoint 
                                        
4  Shereda 1997 Geo Wash J Int'l L & Econ 297. 
5  Only High Courts can grant restraint orders. See further Keightley Asset Forfeiture 36-39. 
6  S 26 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (hereafter referred to as 
 POCA or the Prevention of Organised Crime Act). 
7  Ss 26-29 of POCA. Property is referred to in s 14 of the POCA. The category of realisable 
property is widely framed and extends beyond property owned by the defendant. It is therefore 
possible to obtain a restraint order over property which is technically owned by someone else, 
provided that the defendant has an interest in it. The wide ambit of realisable property is 
necessary in order to deal with criminals who in an effort to protect and conceal their property 
place it in the name of third parties and family members.  
8 S 26(1) of POCA. 
9 This may, in terms of s 26(2) of POCA, include property specified in the restraint order and held 
by a defendant, or unspecified property held by a defendant, and all property transferred by a 
defendant to another person after the order was made. 
10 NDPP v Kyriacou 2003 2 SACR 524 (SCA). 
11 NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 1 SACR 530 (SCA). 
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a curator from private practice12 to take charge of the property; order any person to 
surrender the property to the curator; authorise the police to assist the curator in 
seizing the property; and place restrictions upon the encumbering or transferring of 
immovable property.13  
It is submitted that, in the light of the fact that once a restraint order is granted or is 
confirmed, prior to a conviction, absent requirements for variation or rescission laid 
down in section 26(10)(a) of POCA, a restraint order is not capable of being 
changed, and thus the defendant is stripped of the restrained assets and any control 
or use of them, and therefore pending the conclusion of the trial or the confiscation 
proceedings he is remediless. This has grave constitutional consequences which will 
be expounded upon in chapter 6 of this article. The period from the date of granting 
the restraint order to the granting of a confiscation order may be a very lengthy 
period which may take months or years. In current times criminal cases are known 
to be postponed several times.14 Where a defendant decides to appeal a conviction 
or sentence, the period of being "remediless" may be far longer.15 Where the curator 
removes a defendant's property for storage, the costs related thereto are likely to be 
huge and the condition of the property may deteriorate, if not properly maintained, 
over such a long period. This could have an adverse impact on the defendant's 
financial position, which would inevitably have a profound effect on his human rights 
detailed in the Bill of Rights. 
The NDPP does not have to establish a threat of dissipation of property in order to 
obtain a restraint order.16 The inherent purpose of a restraint order is to preserve 
property on the premise that there is a strong possibility that the property in 
question may be realised in satisfaction of a confiscation order.17 The restraint order 
ensures that property is preserved so that the property might in due course be 
                                        
12 It is essential that a curator should not be attached to the state and must comply with the 
requirements of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 (as amended). 
13  Part 3 of Ch 5 of POCA. 
14 ABSA Bank Ltd v Fraser (CC) unreported case number 66/05 of 15 December 2006 para 11-12. 
15  Phillips v NDPP 2003 2 SACR 410 (SCA) 414. 
16  NDPP v Phillips 2002 4 SA 60 (W). 
17  NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 1 SACR 530 (SCA). 
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realised in satisfaction of a confiscation order.18 The property which is restrained is 
held as security against the confiscation order which is anticipated.19 This means that 
realisable property is not necessarily limited to property which is tainted by the 
alleged offence.20 Property which was legitimately acquired by the defendant may 
also be restrained.21 The latter principle is also applicable to the legitimate property 
of a third party who received an affected gift from a defendant, because such 
property is realisable property, and it may be subject to realisation in satisfaction of 
a confiscation order granted against a defendant.22 It is submitted that this stance of 
POCA is constitutionally questionable because it essentially amounts to the arbitrary 
deprivation of legitimate property. A restraint order may be made over property 
specified in the restraint order or over all the realisable property of a defendant, 
irrespective of whether it is specified in the restraint order or not.23 In addition it 
may also be made over property which will be transferred to the defendant in the 
future.24 Thus, where a restraint order is appropriate the NDPP may seek to restrain 
all of the defendant's assets, including unknown assets, and in addition may request 
the court to order the defendant to divulge the whereabouts and all relevant details 
of any unknown assets.  
Furthermore, even before a criminal prosecution has been instituted the NDPP may 
apply for a restraint order. However it is a jurisdictional requisite that if the 
prosecution against the defendant has not yet been instituted the court must be 
satisfied that the defendant is to be charged with an offence.25 The prosecution need 
not be imminent nor is a charge sheet a prerequisite for the latter jurisdictional 
requisite.26 The NDPP must set out its case in such a manner that the defendant is 
                                        
18  NDPP v Rebuzzi 2002 1 SACR 128 (SCA). 
19  NDPP v Rebuzzi 2002 1 SACR 128 (SCA). 
20  NDPP v Rebuzzi 2002 1 SACR 128 (SCA). 
21  NDPP v Rebuzzi 2002 1 SACR 128 (SCA). 
22  S 32 of POCA. 
23  S 26(2) of POCA. 
24  S 26(2) of POCA.  
25  S 25(1)(b)(i) of POCA. 
26  S 25(1)(b)(i) of POCA. 
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fairly informed of the case that he or she is called upon to meet, but that does not 
mean that it must be presented in any particular form.27  
It is submitted that there is no apparent reason why POCA does not contain a 
specific provision which spells out clearly the details of the case. This practice has 
the potential for the abuse of the defendant's rights. It is submitted that the 
defendant should be given full details as to why such an action against him is being 
contemplated on the basis of the fundamental rights he enjoys in terms of the 
Constitution, such as the right to privacy. Furthermore, it is a jurisdictional 
requirement that it must appear to the court that there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that a confiscation order "may" be made against the defendant.28 This 
means that a court considering an application for a restraint order is required to 
assess what "may" occur in the future, that is, whether the criminal court "may" 
convict the defendant and whether it "may" find that the defendant benefitted from 
the relevant criminal offences or criminal activities related thereto. It is submitted 
that such a practice is constitutionally questionable because the basis for the 
deprivation of the defendant's rights is weak. 
It is also submitted that there is uncertainty regarding what the standard of 
"reasonable grounds for believing" entails. A restraint order can be made only once 
the NDPP "has discharged the onus of showing a reasonable prospect of obtaining 
both a conviction in respect of some or all of the charges levelled against the 
accused person and a subsequent confiscation order".29 Where there are multiple 
charges, the NDPP will have to show that the defendant could derive a benefit from 
the offences with which he or she is charged.30 The court making the restraint order 
does not have to determine that the offences were probably committed. The court 
need only determine that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a court 
                                        
27  NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 SACR 530 (SCA) 541. 
28  Ss 25(1)(a)(ii) and 25(1)(b)(ii) of POCA.  
29  NDPP v Tam 2004 1 SACR 126 (W). 
30  NDPP v Tam 2004 1 SACR 126 (W). 
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might find that the offences were committed.31 This is a "comparatively light onus of 
proof on the NDPP".32  
In NDPP v Kyriakou,33 it was held that the reasonable grounds for believing standard 
did not require the NDPP to factually prove that a confiscation order will be made, 
and therefore there were no grounds for determining the existence of reasonable 
grounds for the application of the principles and the onus that applies in ordinary 
motion proceedings.34 In NDPP v Rautenbach35 the court held that in determining 
whether there were reasonable grounds for believing that a confiscation order might 
be made, the court needed to ask only if there was evidence that might reasonably 
support a conviction and a consequent confiscation order, even if all the evidence 
had not been brought before it, and whether that evidence might reasonably be 
believed.36 This means that the latter will not be the case where the evidence sought 
to be relied upon proves unreliable. The above two judgements reveal that the 
reasonable grounds for believing standard is rather weak when compared with the 
standard that an applicant in ordinary motion court proceedings is expected to meet.  
Persons affected by a restraint order are deprived of property rights pertaining to 
property to which the restraint order applies.37 They are prohibited from dealing in 
any manner with the property.38 Furthermore the restraint order usually entails an 
order directing the defendant and other affected persons to surrender their property 
to a curator bonis appointed under section 28 of POCA. It is submitted that there are 
constitutional safeguards against the arbitrary deprivation of property rights,39 and 
therefore the discretion granted to the court in granting restraint orders is 
questionable. There are no tangible safeguards in POCA to ensure that the court 
does not exercise a purely subjective discretion. The constitutional protection against 
                                        
31  NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 SACR 530 (SCA) 544. 
32  NDPP v Mtungwa 2006 1 SACR 122 (N). 
33  NDPP v Kyriakou 2003 2 SACR 524 (SCA). 
34  NDPP v Kyriakou 2003 2 SACR 524 (SCA). 
35  NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 SACR 530 (SCA). 
36  NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 SACR 530 (SCA) 550-551. 
37  NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 SACR 530 (SCA) 550-551. 
38  NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 SACR 530 (SCA) 550-551. 
39  S 25(1) of the Constitution: No one may be deprived of property except in terms of a law of 
general application and no law may permit the arbitrary deprivation of property. 
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the arbitrary deprivation of property rights requires that there should be a rational 
relationship between means and ends.40 This implies that as far as criminal forfeiture 
is concerned there must be a rational relationship between the purpose served by a 
restraint order and the effect of the order on the individuals concerned. There 
should be no arbitrary deprivation of property rights. 
2.2 The confiscation and the realisation stage41 
The criminal forfeiture scheme set out in Chapter 5 of POCA is closely modelled on 
that found in the United States and in the United Kingdom's Criminal Justice Act,42 
and South African courts draw assistance and have cited with approval from 
judgements of American and English courts in a number of cases.43  
In South Africa the "confiscation stage" entails an enquiry by the court convicting a 
defendant into any benefit that he derived from any of the offences in respect of 
which he has been convicted or from any related criminal activity. If successful, this 
stage of proceedings manifests in a confiscation order, which takes the form of a 
money judgement against the defendant, and in terms of which he is required to 
pay a specific sum of money to the state.44 Unless the court is able to determine the 
issue of confiscation on the basis of evidence and the proceedings of the trial,45 or 
on the basis of further oral evidence,46 it will direct the prosecutor and the defendant 
to deliver statements contemplated in section 21 of POCA. 
The confiscation stage of proceedings begins only after a defendant has been 
convicted. Here the term "confiscation" is used in a broad sense. During the 
confiscation stage the public prosecutor in the criminal case may apply to the court 
to conduct what is generally referred to as a confiscation inquiry. The primary 
                                        
40  S 25 of the Constitution. 
41  In this article the terms "assets" and "property" are used interchangeably. See further Keightley 
Asset Forfeiture 36-39.  
42  United Kingdom Criminal Justice Act, 1998. 
43  See for example Shaik v State 2007 2 All SA 150 (SCA) 155, where the court relied on the 
decision in R v Simpson 1998 2 CR App R (S) 111 on the issue of the possibility of multiple 
restraint orders; and Shaik v State 2007 2 All SA 150 (SCA) 158, where the court relied on R v 
Smith 2002 1 All ER 367 (HC) in finding that "benefit" means gross, as opposed to net benefit. 
44  Ss 18-24 of POCA. 
45  S 18(6)(a)(i) of POCA. 
46  S 18(6)(a)(ii) of POCA. 
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purpose of the confiscation inquiry is to determine whether the defendant has 
benefited from any of the offences in respect of which he or she was convicted or 
from any criminal activity which the court finds to be sufficiently related to those 
offences.47 This is determined according to the civil standard of a balance of 
probabilities.48  
Where the court conducting the confiscation enquiry finds that the defendant 
benefited, the court may make an order against the defendant for the payment to 
the state of any amount that it considers appropriate.49 This generates the second 
phase of the confiscation inquiry, which is directed at determining if and for what 
amount a confiscation order should be made. Section 18(2) of POCA indicates the 
amount the court may order the defendant to pay the state.  
In addition to specifying what the upper limit of a confiscation order may be, it lies 
with the discretion of the court to determine any appropriate amount below the 
upper limit. The discretion of the court at a confiscation inquiry is wide,50 and largely 
depends on the facts of each case. The court must exercise its discretion rationally.51 
The court must ensure and also be satisfied that the confiscation order it makes is 
rationally connected to the purpose sought to be achieved by the confiscation 
order.52  
The underlying purpose of a confiscation order is to ensure that criminals do not 
enjoy the fruits of their criminal conduct.53 The confiscation order is intended to be a 
deterrent against criminality and to deprive convicted persons of ill-gotten gains.54 It 
is further directed at removing from criminals the financial means of committing 
further crimes.55 The confiscation order is in addition to any punishment the court 
                                        
47   S 18(1) of POCA. See further NDPP v Niemoller (WLD) unreported case number A560/04 of 15 
November 2004. 
48  S 18(1) of POCA. 
49  S 18(1) of POCA. 
50  Shaik v State 2007 2 All SA 150 (SCA) 158. 
51  Shaik v State 2007 2 All SA 150 (SCA) 158. 
52  Shaik v State 2007 2 All SA 150 (SCA) 158. 
53  Shaik v State 2007 2 All SA 150 (SCA) 159. 
54  NDPP v Rebuzzi 2002 1 SACR 128 (SCA) 133. 
55  Shaik v State 2007 2 All SA 150 (SCA) 159. 
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may impose for an offence.56 A confiscation order which has the effect of being 
punishment is contrary to the law.57  
The confiscation order is directed at confiscating benefits that have accrued to the 
defendant, regardless of whether he or she is still in possession of the proceeds in 
question.58 It has been held that the purpose of a confiscation order is to ensure that 
a defendant loses the fruits of his or her criminal actions, in addition to acting as a 
deterrent.59 Despite the fact that the deterrent purpose may have punitive 
consequences for a defendant, this will not in itself render the confiscation order 
illegal or unjustifiable in the sense of being an arbitrary deprivation of property.60  
The definition of "proceeds of unlawful activities"61 applies both for the purposes of 
Chapter 6 of POCA regarding civil forfeitures and confiscation inquiries. The choice of 
language for the purposes of criminal forfeiture is questionable, as it borrows directly 
from the provisions of Chapter 6 regarding civil forfeitures. In NDPP v Mtungwa,62 
Hunt J maintained that the definition of "proceeds of unlawful activities" was widely 
worded.63 He rejected the NDPP's submission that sections 18 and 22 of POCA 
become operational when the "unlawful activities" are a causa sine qua non of the 
benefits, maintaining rather that the court is constitutionally bound to apply the 
more stringent test, which is the causa causans test.64  
Section 20 of POCA provides for the amounts which may be realised at the time of 
making a confiscation order against a defendant. Section 20(1) of POCA allows the 
court the discretion to allow or disallow claims. The obligations subtracted in terms 
of section 20(1) are those which have "priority and which the court may recognise 
                                        
56  S 18(1) POCA. 
57  NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 SACR 530 (SCA) 552. 
58  NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 SACR 530 (SCA) 552. 
59   NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 SACR 530 (SCA) 552. 
60  Shaik v State 2007 2 All SA 150 (SCA) 159-160. 
61 Section 1 of POCA: the definition of "proceeds of unlawful activities" for the purposes of a 
confiscation inquiry includes benefits received both directly and indirectly. In Shaik v State 2007 
2 All SA 150 (SCA) para 64, it was held that the proceeds of the defendant's unlawful activities 
included benefits derived by a shareholder of a company that was enriched through the 
shareholders' criminal activities.  
62  NDPP v Mtungwa 2006 1 SACR 122 (N). 
63  NDPP v Mtungwa 2006 1 SACR 122 (N) 129. 
64  NDPP v Mtungwa 2006 1 SACR 122 (N) 129. 
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for this purpose". An assessment of the facts surrounding alleged priority in relation 
to an asset in the defendant's estate will guide the court in deciding whether or not 
to have that asset forfeited. Section 30(5) of POCA provides for possible steps that 
may be taken by the creditors of the defendant. Any of the defendant's expenses in 
connection with an asset and with regard to which the court finds some form of 
"priority" may be deducted by the court when it makes a confiscation order. Section 
18(2) of POCA clearly provides that a confiscation order is not limited to a net 
amount. A confiscation order can be made in respect of any property which falls 
within the ambit of the broader definition of "property".65 
In South Africa as soon as it is established that a material benefit was derived, the 
fact that some of the assets to be confiscated or restrained were acquired by the 
defendant before the offence was committed is irrelevant.66 In South Africa the 
"realisation stage" of criminal asset forfeiture is initiated when a defendant fails to 
satisfy a confiscation order. The "realisation stage" in essence is a specialised form 
of execution against affected property.67 An application for the realisation of property 
takes place after a confiscation order has been granted. The objective of such an 
application is to obtain a court order directing any person who holds realisable 
property to hand such property to the curator bonis.68 The court order empowers the 
curator bonis to obtain property which is not included in the confiscation order. 
Where a curator bonis has not been appointed when an application for a realisation 
order serves before the court, the court hearing the application makes that 
appointment.69 A realisation of property order broadens the application of the 
confiscation order. 
Part 4 of POCA70 deals with the selling of restrained assets by the curator in 
satisfaction of a confiscation order. The state can apply to the High Court for a 
realisation order only if: (i) a confiscation order has been granted and has not been 
settled by the defendant; (ii) a confiscation order is not subject to an appeal or 
                                        
65  Shaik v State 2007 2 All SA 150 (SCA) para 60. 
66  NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 SACR 530 (SCA) 552. 
67  Ss 30-36 of POCA. 
68  S 30 of POCA. 
69  S 30(2)(a) of POCA. 
70 Ss 30-36 of POCA. 
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review; and (iii) a defendant has not been acquitted or the criminal charges against 
him have not been withdrawn.71 All persons known to have interests in the 
restrained assets should be given notice of the application for realisation.72 This 
includes both creditors and victims. It is submitted that such a notice should be 
given by the state. POCA is not clear on what form this notice should take and who 
should monitor compliance. 
2.3 Constitutional concerns about the practice of criminal asset 
forfeiture in South Africa 
The role of the Bill of Rights, which was introduced in South Africa shortly before the 
establishment of the National Prosecuting Authority and the adoption of POCA, is of 
insurmountable importance and significance in the development of the law regarding 
asset forfeiture in South Africa. The Bill of Rights contains and demands far reaching 
protections for individual rights, including the right to equality,73 the right to human 
dignity,74 the right to freedom and security of the person,75 and the protection of 
property rights.76 The South African Constitution places a positive duty on the state 
to respect, protect, promote and fulfil these rights.77 This duty imposes an obligation 
on the state to implement appropriate law enforcement measures in the interests of 
protecting the rights of society.  
It is submitted that in South Africa, a state which is afflicted by high levels of crime, 
this duty can prove to be daunting. Where asset forfeiture is implemented as a law 
enforcement measure, the fulfilment by the state of its public obligation inevitably 
gives rise to a conflict between its public duty and its duty to respect the individual 
rights of persons whose property is affected by asset forfeiture proceedings. The 
                                        
71 S 30(1) of POCA. 
72 S 30(3) of POCA. 
73 S 9 of the Constitution: the right to equality includes the right to equal protection and benefit of 
the law. 
74  S 10 of the Constitution. 
75  S 12 of the Constitution: this includes the right not to be punished in a cruel, inhuman or 
degrading way. 
76  S 25 of the Constitution. 
77  S 7(2) of the Constitution. 
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courts are guided by constitutional imperatives in determining when asset forfeiture 
is justifiable. 
Two recent Constitutional Court cases explored the tension between the robust asset 
forfeiture measures provided for by POCA and the need to avoid arbitrary 
deprivations of property. The first case, Prophet v National Director Public 
Prosecutions,78 involved the use of a residential house as a mini laboratory for the 
manufacture of the drug known as "tik". The second case, Mohunram v National 
Director of Public Prosecutions,79 involved the use of a business premises for the 
running of an unlicensed casino. Both cases concerned applications to forfeit 
immovable property as instrumentalities of an offence. In both cases the 
Constitutional Court confirmed the importance of proportionality in the assessment 
of the constitutional validity of asset forfeiture in terms of POCA, in other words 
weighing the severity of the interference with individual rights to property against 
the extent to which the property was used for the purposes of the commission of the 
offence, taking cognisance of the nature of the offence.80 Proportionality is not a 
statutory requirement but an equitable requirement that has been formulated by the 
courts to curb the excesses of forfeiture. This implies that the requirement of 
proportionality is a constitutional imperative.81 In the light Mohunram v NDPP82 and 
Prophet v NDPP83 it is submitted that in South Africa there are generally two policy 
rationales for asset forfeiture. First, the gains from unlawful activity should not 
accrue and accumulate to those who commit unlawful activity. Those individuals 
should not be accorded the rights and privileges normally attendant to property law. 
In the case of fraud and theft, the proceeds should be retrieved and redistributed to 
the victims. Second, the state as a matter of policy is endeavouring to suppress the 
conditions that lead to unlawful activities. In South Africa the courts have accepted a 
policy rationale based on the fact that it is often impossible to bring the leaders of 
organised crime to book in view of the fact that they invariably ensure that they are 
                                        
78  Prophet v NDPP 2005 2 SACR 670 (SCA). See further Kruger Organised Crime 15-25. 
79  Mohunram v NDPP 2007 4 SA 222 (CC). 
80  Prophet v NDPP 2005 2 SACR 670 (SCA) 678; Mohunram v NDPP 2007 4 SA 222 (CC) 230. 
81  Mohunram v NDPP 2007 4 SA 222 (CC) 237.  
82  Mohunram v NDPP 2007 4 SA 222 (CC). 
83  Prophet v NDPP 2005 2 SACR 670 (SCA). 
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far removed from the overt criminal activity involved. An effective operation against 
organised crime generally succeeds in bringing only the eminently replaceable foot 
soldiers to book. Asset forfeiture circumvents and bypasses this problem by allowing 
the gains of an unlawful enterprise to be brought to justice. 
The three judgements in Mohunram are in agreement that the objective of 
combating organised crime is a relevant factor in the proportionality analysis. Where 
the judgements are in disagreement is with regard to the weight to be given to 
POCA's underlying objective in the proportionality analysis, and in the application of 
the proportionality principle to the facts of the case. In assessing the impact 
Mohunram will have on the future development of the law relating to asset forfeiture 
in South Africa, cognisance ought to be taken of two factors. The first is that much 
will always depend on the facts of each case as they are presented in court. An 
interpretation of the judgements in Mohunram reveals that both the majority and 
minority of the court took into account an array of factors.84 The office of the NDPP 
will certainly be guided by Mohunram in the manner in which it presents future 
cases, and no doubt will select its cases accordingly. The second is that the 
arguments by the amicus in Mohunram focussed specifically on the future of 
instrumentalities under Chapter 6, rather than on proceeds under Chapter 6, or on 
criminal forfeiture under Chapter 5. There are specific and significant differences 
between forfeitures aimed at the proceeds of crime and at the benefits derived from 
criminal activity on the one hand, and at forfeitures aimed at instrumentalities on the 
other. It is submitted that it is less complicated to justify the forfeiture of property 
which a person derived from criminal activity or to require a convicted defendant to 
pay to the state an amount equivalent to what he or she benefitted from the 
relevant criminal activity. Undoubtedly, Chapter 6 civil forfeitures aimed at proceeds, 
and criminal forfeitures under Chapter 5 must survive constitutional scrutiny and 
should not be arbitrary. 
                                        
84  Mohunram v NDPP 2007 4 SA 222 (CC) 234-236, where the following factors are listed: "the 
nature and gravity of the offence, the extent to which ordinary criminal law measures are 
effective in dealing with it, the public impact and the potential for widespread social harm and 
disruption". 
 
V BASDEO  PER / PELJ 2014(17)3 
1061 
3 Concluding remarks and recommendations 
In South Africa criminal asset forfeiture law is an integral part of criminal law 
enforcement. The reasons advanced for including the forfeiture of assets as part of 
criminal law enforcement are varied. Primarily, law enforcement agents and the 
courts want not only to arrest the offender and sentence him or her to imprisonment 
for a period of time, but also to remove the instruments of crime from circulation 
either by the offender himself or herself or by members of his or her organisation.  
In the South African criminal justice system criminal asset forfeiture is a measure 
which is intended to restore the ex ante legal situation by depriving the offender of 
what is not legally his. Systems of criminal law and criminal procedure are based on 
certain principles. In South Africa certain legal provisions of criminal asset forfeiture 
are inconsistent with important principles of substantive and procedural law. Among 
them are the presumption of innocence and the principle that someone can be 
convicted for explicitly indicted and proven criminal offences only. It is debatable 
and questionable whether the serious infringement of these principles can be 
justified. When government creates new laws the focus of these laws should not be 
limited to individual provisions. From a constitutional perspective the following 
specific submissions are made together with recommendations for reform in the area 
of criminal asset forfeiture in terms of POCA:  
(1) From the short title of POCA85 it appears as if POCA deals only with organised 
crime and an impression is created that a definition of "organised crime" can be 
found in POCA. In fact POCA does not define organised crime.86 Its purpose as 
reflected in the short and the long titles and in the preamble is to prevent 
organised crime. POCA introduces new offences of racketeering,87 money 
laundering88 and criminal gang activities,89 which are known organised crimes, 
                                        
85 POCA does not define the concept "organised crime". See NDPP v Vermaak 2008 1 SACR 157 
(SCA) para 4, where Nugent JA used the concept to describe offences that have organisational 
features of some kind that distinguish them from individual criminal  wrongdoing. 
86  De Koker "Organised Crime" 45-46. 
87 Ch 2 of POCA. 
88 Ch 3 of POCA. 
89 Ch 4 of POCA. 
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but it also has a list of 33 pre-existing common law and statutory offences 
referred to in schedule 1, which may be committed by individuals. POCA 
therefore also applies to cases of individual wrongdoing. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal confirmed in NDPP v Geyser90 that POCA also applies to crimes that 
cannot be categorised as organised crimes. Although the issues covered by 
POCA may appear to be disparate, it can be inferred that POCA intends to 
prevent serious crimes committed by individuals, groups or syndicates. It is 
recommended that a more appropriate title will be "The Prevention of 
Organised and Serious Crimes Act", because such a title will cover organised 
crimes as well as cases of serious wrongdoing by individuals. 
(2) In POCA the in rem fiction gives rise to constitutional concerns and can lead to 
legal complications for asset forfeiture. The fiction, which is constitutionally 
problematic, has been criticised internationally, and can lead to unsightly 
paradox in the canon of South African case law. It is recommended that since 
South Africa does not have a binding tradition of forfeiture, the South African 
Constitutional Court should down play the in rem fiction and focus instead on 
criminal doctrinal arguments that illuminate POCA's constitutionality. 
(3) Section 25(1) of the Constitution states that "no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property". There is very little South African jurisprudence 
expounding the concept of arbitrariness. The High Court addressed 
"arbitrariness" in the area of warrants for search and seizure. In Deutschmann 
v Commissioner for the Revenue Service,91 the state after an ex-parte 
proceeding issued a warrant to seize property believed to represent the 
proceeds of tax fraud. The constitutionality of the issuance of the warrant was 
questioned.92 The defendants objected on the ground of arbitrariness and the 
court maintained that:  
                                        
90  NDPP v Geyser 2008 ZASCA 15 [25 March 2008] para 19. 
91  Deutschmann v Commissioner for the Revenue Service 2000 2 SA 106 (E). 
92  Deutschmann v Commissioner for the Revenue Service 2000 2 SA 106 (E). 
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The provisions in terms of which the warrant was sought and obtained in both 
matters do anything but permit arbitrary deprivation of property - these provisions 
require an application supported by information supplied under oath and the 
exercise of a discretion by a Judge. The Judge who authorises the warrant does not 
thereby affect the property or the rights to such property vesting in an individual. 
Any party remains free, in terms of the statute, to establish his entitlement and 
claim delivery.93  
Thus the three pillars enumerated by the court were an informative application; 
discretionary judicial authorisation; and an opportunity to establish entitlement. In 
POCA deprivation is achieved only after an application and the exercise of judicial 
discretion.94 The opportunity to establish entitlement is left with the owner on the 
basis of an innocent owner defence proceeding. On the basis of the above analysis, 
under the South African judiciary's conception of arbitrariness, POCA would probably 
pass constitutional muster with relative ease. 
(a) Joint liability in cases where several persons committed a criminal offence can 
lead to a situation where the forfeited amount goes beyond the amount of the 
individual's interest. This is not consistent with the requirement in POCA that 
only the defendant's interest can be forfeited, and it may lead to a situation 
where the defendant has to forfeit more than he actually obtained. It is 
therefore recommended that where a criminal offence has been committed by 
several persons, the proceeds should be divided proportionally between them. 
Each offender should be held liable for his pro rata share of the proceeds. 
(b) Once a restraint order is granted or confirmed prior to conviction, absent 
requirements for variation or rescission laid down in section 26(5)(a) of POCA, 
a restraint order is not capable of being changed, and thus the defendant is 
stripped of the restrained assets and any control or use of them, and therefore 
pending the conclusion of the trial or the confiscation proceedings he is 
remediless. It is recommended that the defendant should be afforded a remedy 
to reclaim restrained assets during the restraint stage of POCA proceedings, 
because not affording him such a remedy is tantamount to arbitrary deprivation 
of property, a situation which section 25 of the Constitution prohibits.  
                                        
93  Deutschmann v Commissioner for the Revenue Service 2000 2 SA 106 (E). 
94  S 38(1) of POCA. 
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(c) POCA does not make provision for the recovery of interest that has 
accumulated on a "benefit" from the date of the offence to the date of the 
confiscation order and this allows the defendant to enjoy that part of the 
benefit from the crime. It is recommended that the following provision be 
inserted in POCA in order to prevent such practice: 
(d)  Any interest derived from a benefit of the proceeds of crime, from the date of 
the offence to the date of issuance of a confiscation order, is deemed to be 
part of the proceeds of crime.  
(e) In terms of section 30 of POCA it is settled law that criminal asset forfeiture 
makes provision for the consideration of loss suffered by victims of crime. It is 
recommended, however, that section 30 of POCA should distinguish between 
victims who participated willingly in the commission of a crime and those who 
did not. This is of critical importance when it comes to the issue of the 
reimbursement of the victim and is also essential for the wider objective of 
POCA, which is to ensure that crime does not pay.  
(f) The presumption of innocence poses the most serious constitutional challenge, 
as regards forfeiture in terms of POCA. In S v Zuma95 the Constitutional Court 
explicitly set out the parameters of the presumption of innocence protection: 
... the presumption of innocence is derived from the centuries old principle of 
English law. It is always for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused 
person, and the proof must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In S v Zuma the court adopted a two pronged approach:  
(i) The presumption of innocence is infringed whenever the accused is liable to be 
convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. 
(ii) If by the provisions of a statutory presumption an accused is required to 
establish, that is to say to prove or disprove, on a balance of probabilities 
either an element of an offence or an excuse, then it contravenes section 11(d) 
(Interim Constitution, precursor to section 35(3) of the South African 
                                        
95  S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 (CC) 656. 
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Constitution). Such a provision would permit a conviction in spite of reasonable 
doubt.96  
In terms of POCA the state need only prove its case on a balance of probabilities. 
This appears to violate approach (i) above because a reasonable doubt can exist 
regardless of the balance of probabilities standard having being met. The innocent 
owner defence is not an adequate prophylactic because the innocent owner defence 
violates approach (ii) above. It requires the defendant to establish an excuse on a 
balance of probabilities. This is too low a standard. It may permit conviction despite 
a reasonable doubt. Although the presumption of innocence as formulated in Zuma 
does not disqualify the burden shift entailed in POCA per se, it does however 
discredit the balance of probabilities standard advanced by POCA.  
(a) Section 35(3)(m) of the Constitution provides what amounts to a double 
jeopardy provision. With regard to civil asset forfeiture the literal interpretation of 
this provision is that a second trial may not follow, since the first trial if only 
nominally civil would be preclusive. The state would have to combine the POCA 
proceedings with the underlying criminal proceedings and engage in a single unified 
litigation. If POCA was punitive, a body of constitutional rights for the accused would 
follow, effectively eviscerating POCA. Accommodating a meaningful right to counsel 
and requiring a prosecution in conjunction with the civil case would entail increased 
administrative and related costs, while presuming innocence would deprive the state 
of its most powerful law enforcement mechanism under POCA as it stands. In order 
to prevent precipitating the body of constitutional rights, the state would explicitly 
refute arguments that the owner in POCA civil proceedings is an accused facing 
criminal prosecution. 
  
                                        
96  S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 (CC) 656. 
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